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A Comment on the 1968
Amendments to Kentucky Planning
and Land Use Controls Enabling
Legislation
By A. DAN TARLocK*
In 1966 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a complete
revision of planning and land use controls enabling legislation,'
thus giving the state uniform enabling legislation for the first
time in its history. This revision was the subject of an article in
the preceding issue of the Journal.2 The purpose of this brief
article is to supplement the previous discussion by commenting
on amendments to the legislation enacted during the 1968 session
of the General Assembly.
The reception of Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter re-
ferred to as KRS] Chapter 100 among developers, lawyers, pro-
fessional planners, and planning commission members has been
mixed. Many lawyers consider it the product of a group of plan-
ners completely detached from reality and dismiss it as an un-
workable "planners dream." Many of these comments are justi-
fiable reactions to the numerous instances of poor draftsmanship
which permeate the statute. Others, however, are motivated by
hostility toward land use regulation and are oblique methods of
attacking its substance. The Kentucky Department of Commerce
is very sensitive to such criticism, and during the 1968 session
introduced legislation designed to rectify most of the drafting
errors and eliminate the ambiguities.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University (formerly Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Kentucky).
I Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] §§ 100.111-991.
2 Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation:
An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KtRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. LJ. 556 (1968).
3 Senate Bill No. 383 (1968).
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Among the more important changes proposed were more
stringent standards for the exercise of extra-territorial land use
controls,4 a clarification of the alternative procedures for the
adoption of a comprehensive plan,5 clarification of the referral
and publication procedures required for the adoption of a zoning
ordinance,6 and a clearer statement of the status during the transi-
tion period of plans and studies prepared under the previous
legislation.7 In addition, the Department proposed that several
confusing duplications be eliminated.
The Department's bill was not enacted and thus the 1966
version remains intact except for a modification of Section 213. It
is unfortunate that the reform bill did not pass, because most of
the changes were needed and would have made the statute more
workable. However, since the legislation does not become uni-
formly applicable until June 16, 1971,8 the General Assembly
will have another opportunity to enact needed revisions.
The General Assembly enacted only one amendment to
Chapter 100 during the 1968 session. Section 213 previously re-
quired that both the planning commission and the local legisla-
tive body or the fiscal court find a map amendment to be con-
sistent with the comprehensive plan before it would be given
effect. This gave the planning commission a veto over the
legislative body. The 1968 General Assembly rescinded the veto
power and now a map amendment can be granted if either the
planning commission or the local legislative body or fiscal court
makes the finding.9
4Senate Bill No. 383 § 3 (1968). The most important proposed reform would
have precluded the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction until a comprehensive
plan for the area was adopted.
5 Senate Bill No. 383 § 10 (1968). The proposed amendment to KRS §
100.197 (1966) would have given a planning commission the option of either
holding one public hearing when all elements of a comprehensive plan had been
completed or a series of hearings as each separate element was adopted.
6 Senate Bill No. 383 § 13 (1968).
7Senate Bill No. 883 § 18 (1968).
8KRS § 100.367 (1966).
9House Bill No. 398 (1968). The purposes and provisions of which are as
follows:
AN AcT relating to planning and zoning.
W inEAs, the 1966 General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky enacted House Bill No. 390, AN AcT relating to planning and
zoning, a purpose of which was to encourage intergovernmental coopera-
tion between cities and counties by encouraging them to form joint and
regional planning units, and
(Continued on next page)
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The double veto contained in Section 213 was one of the most
significant innovations introduced by the 1966 revision of Chapter
100. The objective of its supporters was to protect the integrity of
the adopted comprehensive plan. The planning commission was
made coequal in authority with the local legislative body or fiscal
court because the Legislature had delegated to them the power
to approve or disapprove map amendments. The assumption be-
hind Section 213 was that members of the commission would be
less responsive to financial and political pressures to amend the
comprehensive plan out of existence. The accumulated evidence
concerning planning commission performance across the country
tends to cast doubt on the factual validity of this assumption;10
therefore, it is probable that the amendment will not unduly
diminish the effectiveness of Chapter 100 in achieving its basic
objective of tying the administration of land use controls to the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
WHnEAs, it was the intention of the General Assembly in so enacting
House Bill No. 390 to make recommendations of planning commissions
more responsible to the will of the people through their elective repre-
sentatives by providing for the overruling of recommendations of the
various planning commissions by a simple majority of the appropriate
legislative body or fiscal court having jurisdiction, and
WnmEns, Section 84 of said House Bill No. 390 (being KRS
100.213) has been improperly construed so as to indirectly limit the
power of the legislative bodies or fiscal courts to overrule recommenda-
tions by planning commissions of disapproval of map amendments, thus
encroaching upon and limiting the legislative powers vested by said
House Bill No. 890 in the various legislative bodies and fiscal courts,
all of which is deemed detrimental to the welfare of the people and con-
trary to the expressed "ntention of the General Assembly in its enactment
of said House Bill No. 390.
Now, THEEFOBE,
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
Section 1. KRS 100.213 is amended to read:
Before any map amendment is granted, the planning commission or
[and] the legislative body or fiscal court must find that the map amend-
ment is in agreement with the community's comprehensive plan, or, in
the absence of such a finding, that one or more of the following apply
and such finding shall be recorded in the minutes and records of the
planning commission [and] or the legislative body or fiscal court.
(1) That the original zoning classification given to the property was
inappropriate or improper.
(2) That there have been major changes of an economic, physical or
social nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the
community's comprehensive plan and which have substantially altered
the basic character of such area.
Senate Bill 97 (1968), which did not pass, would have made the change
retroactive to June 16, 1966.
1o See R. BAncocE, THm ZoNmG GA-n 19-61 (1966).
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policies contained in the comprehensive plan. However, the
double veto was a worthy experiment in making the administration
of land use controls more responsive to professional planning. Be-
fore it is interred, the double veto concept merits analysis.
Section 213 was amended because the Lexington-Fayette
County Planning Commission and the Fayette County Fiscal
Court could not agree on a location policy for industrial parks
and regional shopping centers." The city-county land use plan
divides the county into two service areas-urban and rural. De-
velopment is to be confined to the urban service area in order to
preserve the surrounding horse farms as a private green belt.1
2
The Commission's success in implementing this plan has been
mixed. Major residential development has been deflected away
from the horse farms,'1 although selected intrusions such as a
research center have been allowed.
Unfortunately, the Commission has been less successful in
coping with the development of land around the interchanges of
the interstate highway which bisects the county. In 1962 an
interstate service district was established for a large national motel.
In 1966 the Commission received an application for a large in-
dustrial park to be located adjacent to a proposed interchange in
the southern end of the county. The area was rural but was out-
side the horse farm district. The Commission found that the park
was not consistent with the dual-service district policy and re-
fused to approve a map amendment 14 while the Fiscal Court did
approve the amendment. The deadlock could not be broken so
the case was taken to circuit court which ruled that since Section
11 Letter from Robert A. Metry, Counsel, Department of Commerce, to author,
April 8, 1968, on file with KENTucxY LAW JOURNAL.
12 CCoruNTY PLANNING ComaN'e, LEXINrToN-FAYEITE COUNTY, KEN-
TUCKY, A PLAN FOR LAxN USE (1966).
13 The Fayette Circuit Court has upheld the power of the Planning Com-
mission to deny a map amendment for a subdivision on the grounds that it en-
croaches on the rural service area. Provincial Dev. Co. v. Webb. No. 7973
(Fayette Cir. Ct., Fayette County, Ky. 1961).
14
LExiNGToN-FAyxE= CrrY-CouNry PLANmNG Comm'N, MnuTEs 9-10
(Sept. 29, 1966). The Fiscal Court maintained that the industrial park was con-
sistent with the city-county green belt policy because it would not encroach on
the horse farms and that the Court has consistently opposed development in the
northern part of the county where many of the major farms are located. The
Planning Commission recently recommended a twenty acre interchange service
area on the edge of the horse farm area over the objections of the Fiscal Court.
The Fiscal Court argued that the service area encroached on the horse farms and
thus was inconsistent with the city-county land use plan. Louisville Courier-
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213 required both bodies to approve the amendment and only
one had done so, the amendment must be denied.15 Unable to
obtain relief in the courts, the disappointed applicants were able
to secure relief through the Legislature.
The stated purpose of House Bill 398 was to restore exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove map amendments to the local
legislative bodies or the fiscal court in order to "make recom-
mendations of planning commissions more responsive to the will
of the people through their elected representatives ... ." It should
be noted at the outset that the choice made by the General As-
sembly was not constitutionally required. The zoning power
emanates from the General Assembly and it is free to delegate the
power to local legislative bodies, fiscal courts or to any other body,
state or local.
The breadth of the General Assembly's power to delegate
zoning authority is illustrated by Southeastern Displays, Inc. v.
Ward.'6 To comply with the Highway Act of 1965, the General
Assembly delegated the power to control billboards within the
corporate limits of Commonwealth municipalities to the Depart-
ment of Highways.' 7 In sustaining the delegation of power, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the argument that this contravened
the inherent police power of the city stating that, "[T]he city's
power to zone is derived solely from express authority conferred
on the municipality by the state legislature. It has no inherent
police power."' 8 The delegation in Ward was made to a non-
elective state administrative agency, but the same reasoning
should apply to a delegation of all or part of the zoning function
to a non-elective local body.19
15 Sexton v. Thompson, No. 19840 (Fayette Cir. Ct., Fayette County, Ky.
1966).
16414 S.W.2d 573 (1967).
17 For a discussion of the federal and state legislation see Zoning, 1967-68
Court of Appeals Review, 56 Ky. L.J. 429-34 (1968).
'8Id.
19 Cf. Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty Co. 219 Md. 155, 148 A.2d 424
(1959). The state enabling act empowered an administrative official to change use
district boundaries and the Supreme Court of Maryland upheld the delegation,
reasoning in part that the doctrine of separation of powers does not apply to the
local level and thus the legislature is free to delegate zoning functions to
legislative bodies or administrative officials. In short, "the problem is one of
vires, not constitutionality." Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in
Zoning Administration, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 60, 87. The article contains a thorough
discussion of the delegation problem. It appears that Ward adopts this approach.
Journal, May 24, 1968, § B, at 2, col. 4.
(Continued on next page)
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Popular control over the administration of land use controls
is consistent with democratic values and should be encouraged.
However, one could argue that, over the long run, the 1966
version of Section 213 would have been more effective in achieving
such popular control. The 1968 version may not give members of
the general community any more control over planning and land
use controls than they now have, but it will give disappointed
applicants one more forum in which they can appeal before
resorting to the courts or state legislature. It is too soon to predict
what effect this may have on the integrity of plans prepared under
Chapter 100. The revision may make it easier to amend them out
of existence or it may make it possible to temper the plans with
the necessary practicality which they sometimes lack.
The important point to consider is whether more popular
control might have been achieved under the previous version of
Section 100. One could argue that it would have helped to shift
attention to public participation in the formulation of the plan.
This author believes that popular control can best be achieved if
the values and, prior to adoption, strategies contained in the plan,
receive widespread public debate by interested developers,
property owners, and the general public. Too often plans are
prepared by a staff or outside consultants, and served up in
packaged form to the general public which is then invited to the
required public hearing and comment.
The objection most often heard is that a proposed plan does
not make sufficient land available for industrial sites, which in
reality means that the landowner is concerned because his tract
has not been projected for industrial zoning. The values of the
community and their relation to the plan are seldom given ex-
tensive debate. If the planning commission were given the power
to control implementation of the plan rather than being relegated
to an advisory function, perhaps interested members of the com-
munity would take a more active role in the formation process
and exert more influence over the final result than at present.
These thoughts are, of course, speculation but do indicate that the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The state may not, of course, delegate the zoning function to judicial bodies.
American Beauty Homes, Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning
Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964) (trial de novo: unconstitutional delegation.)
[VOL 57,
PLANNMG AND LAND UsE, CONTROL
original version of Section 213 was an experiment worth con-
ducting.
The only other planning amendments passed during the 1968
session were to Chapter 147, which governs area planning com-
missions. KRS H 147.670 and 147.700 were amended to include
in area planning commission master plans all incorporated and
unincorporated territory within its jurisdiction. The commission
was given the choice of preparing a land use plan or minimum
requirements for zoning ordinances in addition to their text and
graphic portrayals of minimum subdivision regulations. These
standards or the plan may then be submitted to the county.
20
A rational system of land use controls can contribute to Ken-
tucky's economic improvement. The first step is the passage of a
modern and workable enabling act. Chapter 100 is a reasonably
modern statute but many minor revisions are in order. It is hoped
that such a revision will receive high priority during the 1970
session of the General Assembly.
2 0 Senate Bill No. 279 (1968).
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